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First Asian Meeting of the International Seminar on Macroeconomics,
Tokyo, June 7-8, 1988, organized by the Ministry of Finance (Japanese
Government), FAIR, la maison des sciences de l'homme and NBER.

Abstract

This paper studies the trends of current accounts and accompanying capital
movements from a growth-theoretic perspective and attempts to predict the
credit-debt structure among major industrialized countries (the United States,
Japan and West Germany), at the turn of the twenty-first century.

The past

movements of national savings and investment support the "habitat" view by
Feldstein and Horioka that the supply of savings create investment where it is
generated.

Rapid increases in the United States foreign debt may imply,

however, the relevance of the "traditional" view that capital moves so as to
equate its rates of return.

The simulation exercises show that the ratio of

external debt to capital stock in the United States will rise to 30-40% over the
long run in the absence of the recovery of its savings ratio to the historical
standard of the 1970s.

2

On the International Capital Ownership Pattern at the Turn of the
Twenty First Century 1
Koichi Hamada and Kazwnasa Iwata

In 1987, the current account surplus of Japan was about 87 billion dollars
or about 3.5 percent of its GNP.

The current account surplus of West Germany

was about 80 billion Marks, i.e. 45 billion dollars or close to 4 percent of its
GNP.

On the other hand, the current account deficit of the United States with

Japan and West Germany were respectively 54 billion dollars and 22 billion
dollars in 1986.
Needless to say, the accwnulation of current account surplus (or deficit)
implies that a nation accwnulates net credit (or liability) to the rest of the
world.

At the end of 1986, the United States holds net external debt amounting

to 264 billion dollars (6.3% of nominal GNP), while Japan and Germany hold net
foreign assets amounting to 180 billion dollars (8.6% of nominal GNP) and 64
billion dollars (8.6% of nominal GNP) respectively.

Table 1 indicates that

Japan and West Germany are emerging as major capital exporting countries, and
that the United States is shifting its position from one of capital exporter to
capital importer.
How far will these trends continue and what will the credit-liability
structure among major ind~strial countries become?

This paper is an attempt to

assess these trends of current accounts and accompanying capital movements from

1 This work is supported by a research project "Studies of the Prospective
International Capital Ownership" sponsored by the National Institute for
Research Advancement (NIRA). We are indebted to Stanley Black for useful
discussions and to Wooheon Rhee and Sahoko Kaji for their research assistance.
We also thank the two discussants, Paul Krugman and Giorgio Basevi.
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a growth-theoretic perspective and to predict credit-debt structure among major
industrialized countries in the long run, say, at the turn of the twenty-first
century.

We take the United States, Japan and West Germany as specimens of

major industrialized countries.
The changing international credit-debt structure depends on the path of net
national excess savings over investment, which in turn depends on the
intertemporal consumption choice of economic agents.

In the "traditional" view;

(e.g. A. MacDougall 1960, Kemp 1962), capital as a factor of production moves in
such a way as to equate its rates of return among countries.

In the world where

capital movements are getting more and more liberalized, the difference in
saving ratios has a significant long--iun consequence.

Hamada (1966) and Ruffin

(1979) extended the traditional view on capital movements by applying the
neoclassical growth theory, and derived a simple formula for the asymptotic
credit (or debt) capital ratio in the world economy where the capital market is
integrated. 2

Hamada (1966) also proposed a hypothesis on the determinants of

capital movements that was tested with the U.S.-Canadian example.

Hamada and

Iwata (1985) applied this approach to the recent trend in capital export of
Japan to the United States and showed that capital movements take more or less
similar patterns to those predicted by the theoretical model after the
deregulation of Japanese capital control in 1980.
On the other hand, Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and Feldstein (1983)
provide empirical evidences that national investment moves closely with national
savings.

According to them, due to various reasons including capital control

Ontisuka (1974) applied a similar approach to a small open economy. His
contribution lies in his explicit attention to adjustment costs involved in
investment activities and consideration of the stage of development of a
national economy from a debtor to a creditor.
2
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and imperfection of the world capital market, the picture that national
investment is created by the supply of savings is more realistic than the
picture we described above under the assumption of perfect capital mobility.
Their view created a series of disputes on the degree of international capital
mobility.

Some (e.g. Sachs 1981, Obstefeld 1986a,b) cast doubt on this view

which we may call the "habitat" view, while others found results on saving and
investment relationships similar to the Feldstein-Horioka paper.

(For a summary

of empirical analysis on this problem, see Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson
(1987)).
If their view were correct in its most extreme form, i.e., if national
savings supply were to create its own demand completely, the imbalance in
current account would be only a temporary phenomenon.
the U.S. current account will return to an equilibrium.

After proper adjustments,
Recent trends in the

current account of the three major economies, however, seem to suggest that the
imbalances may be chronic and that they may be related to various long-term
macroeconomic parameters.
We believe that the truth lies in the middle between the extreme form of
the Feldstein-Horioka view and our conjecture that capital movements are
determined by macroeconomic parameters and underlying economic behaviour that
determines the course of economic growth.

In the light of recent imbalances of

current account in these countries, the United States, Japan and West Germany,
we hope to show that growth-theoretic parameters have significant implications
for the international credit-debt structure.

We will depend on a multi-country

version of the Solow-type growth model with a single product.

Among many

factors neglected or simplified in this paper, let us point out here two
important ones.

First, the effects of relative prices or real exchange rates

are neglected.

Some of our results may be affected if we introduce more than
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two commodities and allow relative prices to change.

For example, progressive

real appreciation of Japanese and German currencies may lead to lower net
exports, and eventually, through income and wealth effects, to lower household
saving rates in these countries.

Further studies are needed to answer this kind

of question, although our intuition that a country with a lower time-preference
will become a substantial lender seems to hold in a more general setting.
Secondly, the role of fiscal policy, and, in particular, that of deficit
spending is not fully analyzed in this paper, except that our simulation
exercises implicitly assume specific paths of fiscal expenditures and deficits
in the future.

If we were to adopt the Neo-Recardian position -

a position

that seems to be hardly justifiable from recent behavior of United States
national savings--, the actual and expected path of fiscal deficit would not
matter.

Still, the actual and expected path of government expenditures could.

A more strucutred study of fiscal policies is to be left for future research.
In Section 2, we develop a multi-country growth model as a frame of
reference for the discussion of the long-'run equilibrium of the asset-liability
structure in the world economy.

Section 3 is an overview of macroeconomic

variables of these three countries, and presents a conjecture concerning the
possible long-'run state of the world economy.

In Section 4, we present some

simulation results, which suggest that, if the saving patterns of these three
countries remain more or less the same as in the past decade, the United States
will emerge as a heavily indebted economy vis-a-vis Japan and West Germany.

The

increase in the U.S. savings ratio will be a more effective remedy to reduce the
U.S. indebtedness than the decrease in the Japanese or German savings ratio.
(For the analysis of the current-accoun t imbalance between the United States and
Japan, see, e.g. Frankel (1988), Fukao (1988) and Ueda (1988)).
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2.

The Long-Run Model of International Lending
Let us construct a multi-country growth model that sheds light on the

long~un property of the asset-liability structure resulting from different
saving behavior among nations, under neoclassical assumptions on capital
movements.

Assume for simplicity that two countries produce the same good by

identical linear homogenous well-behaved production functions.

The presentation

below is done for a two-country case, but the result can be generalized for any
number of countries

P(t) = F(K(t), N(t)) = Nf(k(t)),
P* (t) = F(K* (t), N* (t)) = N* f(k * (t))

(1)

where P(t), K(t), N(t) and k(t) = K(t)/N(t) are output, capital stock, labor and
per-capita capital stock respectively of the home country at time t.
a per-capita production function.
country.

f(k(t)) is

The starred variables are for the foreign

Assume that he labor force is growing at an identical exponential rate

of A, that is N(t) = N(O)e At and N* (t) = N* (o)e At where N(t) is the labor force
at time t.

The relative size of the countries is expressed by 0 = N(t)/(N(t) +

N* (t)) and 0*

N* (t)/(N(t) + N* (t)) so that 0+0 * =1.

Neglecting any adjustment

costs involved in domestic as well as foreign investment, we obtain

K(t)

·* (t)
S(t) + B (t) , K

X(t)

K(t) - B(t)

s* (t)

- B(t)

(2)

or

·* (t)
S(t), X

·* (t) + B·* (t)
K

*

S (t)

(3)

where S.(t) and K.(t) are savings and capital stock. B(t) and X(t) indicate
J
J
borrowing and net assets of the home country. Capital stock and savings are
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measured net of depreciation, and labor is measured by efficiency units.

The

dot indicates time derivatives, X(t) = : , for example.
We assume that capital movements take place in such a way as to equate the
rates of return to capital.

8F(K(t), N(t)) / 8K(t)

*

8F(K (t),

N* (t))

*

/

8K

(4)

or
f'(k(t))

f'(k * (t))

r(k(t))

(5)

Equation (5) implies also the equality of factor intensity:

k(t)

k * (t)

Alternative models can be developed depending on the assumptions concerning
saving behavior.

Assumption (i)

The ratio of savings out of net domestic product is constant.

The saving function under this hypothesis is given by

S(t)

sF(K(t), N(t)), S* (t)

*

*

*

s F(K (t), N (t))

Then the total world accumulation f"(t)(= K(t) + K*(t)) is equal to the total
saving S(t)(= S(t) + s*(t)).

K(t)

S(t)

Accordingly,

sF(K(t), N(t)) + s * F(K* (t), N* (t))
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We also assumes< s * .

Under the assumption of equality of the rates of return

*
- = N+N,
to capital, and denoting N

K(t)/N(t)

where

p

s f(k(t)),

= 0s + 0*s * is the average saving ratio of the world.

(7)

Under the

assumption of constant growth rates of the labor force, (7) can be written in
terms of per capita capital k(t),

k(t)

sf(k(t)) - Ak(t)

(8)

On the other hand, the change in the liability of the home country equals
to the required rate of capital growth minus domestic savings,

B(t)

0 K(t) - sF(K(t), N(t)),

K(t) - S(t)

(9)

Thus, B(t) / N(t) = (s - s)f(k(t)), so that in terms of per capita borrowing of
the home country b(t)

b(t)

(s - s)f(k(t)) - Ab(t)

(10)

Equations (8) and (10) constitute a dynamical system for the evolution of
variables k(t) and b(t).

By construction, the per capita borrowing of the

foreign country b * (t) satisfies,

0b(t) + 0*b * (t)

0

(11)
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Suppose that at the initial moment (t - 0), capital is allocated in such a way
as to equate its rates of return across countries .

Then (8) and (10) will give

the evolution of the common per capita capital and the net foreign debt (or net
foreign asset if negative) of the two countries .
Under the assumptio n of the well-beha ved productio n function, (8) is the
standard Solow growth model and has a stationar y and stable equilibriu m of k,
such that

(12)

k/f(k)

The stationar y solution of per capita borrowing is then given by

b

(s -

s) f(k)/>..

(13)

From (12) and (13) we obtain

b/k

(s - s)/s.

(14)

Or if we define the per-capit a wealth of the home country by x(= k -b)

x/k

s/s

(15)

Obviously , under the assumptio n of constant saving ratio out of domestic
productio n, the ratio of borrowing of a country to the existing capital stock
approache s a constant which depends on the degree to which the world (weighted )
average saving ratio exceeds the saving ratio of the country.

The ratio of net

wealth to existing capital approache s the ratio of domestic saving ratio to the
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world average saving ratio.

Needless to say, the country whose saving ratio is

higher than the world average, i.e. the foreign country in this two-country
model, emerges as a rentier country with a negative value of bin the long run.
In this simplified world the shortage of the saving ratio from the world average
implies a substantial level of international debt.
Of course, assumption (i) is oversimplified.

It would be more natural to

assume constant saving ratio out of national income.

Assumption (ii) the ratio of savings out of national income net of interest
payments is constant.
We define national income of the two countries as

Y(t)

P(t) - r(k(t))B(t), Y* (t)

P* (t) + r(k(t))B(t)

(16)

where r(t)B(t) is the interest payments on debt to the foreign country.

This

saving hypothesis is written as

s

(t)

*

sY(t), S (t)

**

s y (t)

(17)

Exactly by the same reasoning as was used to derive (8) and (10), we obtain

k(t)

sf (k(t)) - >.k(t) -

(Os b(t) + 0*s *b * (t))r(k(t))

(18)

wheres is the average saving ratio, and

.
t))- (0sb(t) + 0*s *b * (t))r(k(t))->.b( t).
b(t)=(s-s)f(k(

(19)
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Equations (18) and (19) describe the evolution of variable k(t) and b(t).
Under Assumption (ii) the equilibrium capital intensity will be higher than
under Assumption (i)

for the following reasons.

Countries with higher saving

ratios accumulate foreign assets and those with lower saving ratios accumulate
The combination of these accumulations will result in a higher

foreign debt.

aggregate saving ratio for the world economy.

Also the magnitude of foreign

debt and asset relative to domestic capital will be larger than under Assumption
(i).

In other words, the distribution of net assets will be more uneven than

expressed in (14), because under Assumption (ii) the country with net foreign
debt will save less, and the country with net foreign assets will save more than
under Assumption (i).

For a detailed analysis of the two-country model, see

Hamada (1966) and Ruffin (1979).

Assumption (iii)

Savings are a constant fraction of the amount of profits.

In other words, we will assume that national savings are proportional to
profits,

s (t)

where

p

and

[r(k(t)) - p]X(t), S* (t)

p

*

[r(k(t))-p * ]X* (t)

are a parameters specific to the two countries.

let us assume p > p * .

(20)

For simplicity

This saving behavior corresponds to the optimal saving of

a representative consumer with the rate of time preference (discount factor)

p
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in the neighborhood of the balanced path. 3

This assumption is thus justified by

microeconomic optimizing saving behavior.

Consider a closed economy optimal saving problem where the representative
individual is maximizing
3

co

f
given k

k

u(c)e -ptdt
0

0

and subject to
f(k) -

C

-

>..k.

Then the optimal consumption path is given by
C

(*) -y-= r(k) - >.. - p,
C

where -y is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, or,
in other words the degree of realtive risk aversion.
In the neighborhood of the stationary state per-capita saving approaches >..k
and c/c is close to zero.

Thert from(*) with c/c = 0, one obtains S/N

In our open model, this implies (20).

(r-p)k.
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The system of differential equations can be written in terms of per capita
net asset x(t).

x<t>
where k(t)

[r(k(t)) -

p -

>..]x(t), x·* (t)

[r(k(t) )-

*

p -

>..]x* (t)

(21)

Ox(t) + 8*x * (t).

This system of differential equations has a non trivial steady-state equilibrium
if

r(k(t)) -

p - >..

r(k(t)) -

p

x > 0, and x *= 0

0

or

*

-

>..

0, x *> 0, and x

(22)

0.

It is easy to show (cf. Hamada 1965) that only the equilibrium
corresponding to

r(k(t)) -

p

*

-

>..

0,

x * > 0, and x

0

(23)

namely the equilibrium that corresponds to non..JZ:ero net assets for the more
patient saving behavior (the foreign country), is stable.

The solution

indicates a state of "imperialistic" expansion of a country with a lower value
of time preference.
The reader may feel uneasy about the strong assumption of country-specific
but constant rates of time preference.

One can agree that the richer a nation

becomes, the more eager will it be to spend.

This implies that the rate of time

preference is an increasing function of income or wealth.

In fact, this
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condition is a necessary condition for a stable asset holding behavior of a
small country facing competitive world capital market, (see Obstfeld (1982) and
Uzawa (1968)).

Assumption

Hence, let us consider the following

(iiia)

Savings are related to profits in such a way that the

ratio of savings to profits be a decreasing function of per-capita net
wealth.

This can be expressed by the saving behavior given by (20), but

p

and

p

*

are now

increasing functions of x(t) and x * (t) such that

dp/dx > 0, dp */dx* > 0.

If the two countries have the same schedule of time preference, then regardless
of the initial distribution the world economy

will approach a steady-state

solution with an identical value of net wealth such that

r(k) - ).

p(x)

* *

(25)

P (x ).

In other words, by construction of per-capita net wealth and per-capita capital

k

X

X

*•

Only under these conditions of identical time preference schedule, the current
account balance will disappear on the steady-state path.

However, if the time

preferences are uniformly different, i.e., for any value of x

15

p(x)

*

~ P (x)'

Then the steady state solution will become the solution of

r(k) - >.

p(x)

* *

p (x)

(26)

where

k

* *.
Ox+Ox

The case for 0

0*= 1/2 is illustrate d in Figure 1.

If country 1, say the

United States, is less patient in its saving behavior than country 2, say Japan,
the United States will turn out to be a debtor country even in the steady state
4
path (recall that k -x =bis the net borrowing of the home country).

3.

The Overview of Macroecon omic Data for the U.S., Japan and Germany
Given the theoretic al framework as a backgroun d, let us examine major

macroecon omic time series after 1960 for the U.S., Japan and Germany.

The rate of time preferenc e may not be a decreasin g function of wealth. If
one is about to starve today and tomorrow as well, one may prefer today's
increase in consumpti on much stronger than tomorrow 's. If that is the case,
then p(x) will be a decreasin g function for values of x in the neighborh ood of
zero. However, we do not explore the implicati on of such an assumptio n here.
4
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Figure 2A indicates net national saving rates defined as the ratio of net
saving to NNP for the three countries . 5

In each country the net saving ratio

seems to have a downward trend, and notably so after 1970.
6
If we take the weighted average of these three countries , the weighted

average saving ratio is 11.8% for 1970--86 (see Table 2).

If the recent 17

years' saving ratios were good indicator s of the future average savings, and if
the world were to consist of only these three countries , then the perfect
capital mobility model under Assumptio n (i) in the previous section would imply
that Japan becomes a major creditor country.

In the long run,

38[=(11.8 -7.3)/11.8 ]% of the United States would be owned by the two foreign
countries .

Japan would own about 98%[=(23 .4-11.8)/1 1.8], and West Germany about

13%[=(13 .2-11.8)/1 1.8] of their respectiv e domestic capital abroad.

In the long

run a large portion of caital stock in the United States will be owned by
foreign countries .

In fact, the simulatio n exercise in Section 4 indicates that

more than 40% of U.S. capital will be owned by foreigner s in 2010 if the
differenc e in saving ratios should remain at the same magnitude as observed in
the 1980s.

In the United States, governmen t expenditu res are not divided into governmen t
consumpti on and public investmen t. This fact makes the U.S. governmen t savings
figures less than they actually are. In addition, it is difficult to estimate
properly the capital consumpti on of the U.S. public capital stock. Here we rely
on the conventio nal national account data published by the OECD, thus neglectin g
the adjustmen t needed for the precise internati onal compariso n of net national
saving (see, Hayashi 1988).
5

The weights are calculate d by the relative national income (expresse d in U.S.
dollars) in each year, and then averaged by the length of the period.
6
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Figure 2B shows recent annual time series of net investment ratios (net
fixed investment plus inventory investment divided by net national product) of
these countries.
rates.

They move more or less in a similar fashion to net savings

This linkage supports in general the "habitat" theory of capital

movements by Feldstein and Horioka.

However, only in the recent five years have

the two ratios diverged from each other significant ly.

This discrepancy

resulted in the substantial current-acc ount surpluses for Japan and West
Germany, and the substantial current-acc ount deficit for the United States (see
Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C).

Notably, the bilateral current account surpluses of

Japan and Germany vis-a-vis the United States increased significant ly in the
1980s.

This corresponds to the decline of the savings ratio in the United

States in the 1980s.

These facts give at least a weak case for the possible

validity of the traditional view of the capital movement in the present world
economy where internation al capital control is becoming less and less effective.
Another important evaluation of aggregate savings is its relationshi p to
profits.

For, under Assumption (iii), the ratio of savings to profits would

eventually determine capital ownership in the world.

Figures 4A and 4B plot

the ratio of saving to non~esiden tial net private capital including private
inventories , and the average rate of return to non~esiden tial net private
capital including private inventories , respectivel y.

Both of them are measured

at replacement cost except for the case of Germany, where the depreciatio n and
capital stock at replacement cost are unavailable .

With respect to Japan and

the United States, capital consumption adjustments are made on profit, net
saving and net capital stock.

Incidentall y, net national savings in Figure 2A

are calculated by the depreciatio n method based on the historic cost.

For the

series of profits in the United States and in Japan we adopted enterprise income
(operating surplus plus property income excluding net property income from
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abroad in the corporate and noncorporate enterprise sector).

In the case of

German profits we employed the figure estimated by Gorzig (1987).
We observe that profit rates tend to converge after the early 1970s,
although the rate in Japan remains higher than other countries except between
1972-73, and in 1976 and 1979.
The Japanese saved substantially less than profits until the beginning of
the 1970's.

Since 1971, however, the Japanese saved an amount almost equivalent

to profits.

West Germany saved slightly less than profits until the early

1970's, but now they save significantly less than their profits.

In the United

States people saved significantly less than their profits during most of the
years under observation.

The analysis in the last section with Assumption (iii)

implies that Japan would be a large creditor, say, a neo-imperialist country if
these tendencies were to continue (see Table 3).

4.

Simulation of the Indebtedness of the United States
Based on the theoretical model combined with parameters such as the saving

ratios, the rates of technical progress and the rates of increase in employment
in the three countries, we can carry out a simulation exercise over medium- and
long-cerm developments of external borrowing by the United States from Japan and
Germany.

This allows us to examine the question of what the likely long-'run

consequence of accumulating external debt in the United States will be, and how
long it will take for the path to reach the neighborhood of a steady state where
the ratio of external debt to net private capital stock more or less stabilizes.
We can also draw implications for policy choices on the external imbalances in
the three countries.

In order to analyze the intermediate-'run implications for
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the flow of funds in the world economy as a basis for the simulation, we will
draw the moving equilibrium values of capital flows derived from our theoretical
model.
Consider a two-country model (m=2) consisting of equations (1) to (5) in
Section 2, and assume the saving behavior expressed by equation (16), i.e.
Assumption (ii).

It has been shown (Hamada 1966, Hamada-Iwata 1985) that the

amount of borrowing by country 1 from country 2 required to equate the net
returns of capital is written as (here we omit the time variable t).

(27)

The subscript indicate the country so that B1 is the external debt of
country 1 to country 2.

If the two economies are producing a single good under

the same production function, and if capital is movable so as to equate the
marginal productivities of capital in two countries, then the changes of
international debt will depend upon
(i)

the difference in savings ratios,

(ii)

the difference in labor growth rates, and

(iii)

a compensating term for the international interest payments transfer.

Equation (27) can be rewritten as

(28)

The empirical studies mentioned above, included the extension of the
analysis by allowing different production functions, different rates of labor
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augmenting technical progress, and introducing the effect of capital flows to
and from the rest of the world other than the two countries in question.
The normalized theoretical value of increase in indebtedness Dis written

(29)

K .
2-

-B
1
K

where g

1

and g

2

are the rates of labor augmenting technical progress in the two

countries, and B. (i=l,2) is the inflow of capital to country i from the rest of
l.

the world.
It is also possible to extend the expression for this theoretical value of
capital movements to the three-country case as

B (from Japan and Germany to the U.S.)
1

(30)

where country 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the U.S., Japan, and Germany.

Equation

(30) is the basic equation utilized in our simulation.
In carrying out the simulation exercise, we have not included land,
although the fit between theoretical and actual values in the case of U.S.-Japan
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The reasons are as follows.

capital movement was much better with land.

the figure of land value in Germany is not available.
land value is difficult to predict.

First,

Secondly, the increase in

The following results may overestimate the

borrowing from Japan, because the rate of capital accumulation is exaggerated by
the exclusion of land in the denominator.

(For the theoretical treatment of

land in a growth model, see Nichols (1970), and Eaton (1988)).
Turning to the procedure of the simulation exercise, we first set the
initial values and parameters of the model.

The values of real net domestic

product, net capital stock and net borrowing by the United States from Japan
($46 billion) and Germany ($34 billion) are those for 1985.

We assume that

capital stock at the initial period (1985) is allocated so as to equate the
rates of returns among countries.

Net debt of the United States to Japan is

taken from the Survey of Current Business, but we estimated net debt from
Germany.

This is because only U.S. net debt to the European Community is

available in the Survey of Current Business.
From the saving function we can derive net national savings, which are
formulated as the function of net national product (net domestic product minus
interest payments).

The interest rate is assumed to be constant at 4% which is

close to the actual rate on external borrowing by the United States from abroad.
With respect to savings ratios, we provide three different scenarios:
Case A:

Savings ratios will remain constant at the level observed in the

1980s; the U.S. (4.4%), Japan (20.3%) and Germany (9.2%).
Case B:

The Japanese savings ratio will decline substantially due to the

aging of the population and the concomitant rise of tax burden including the
contribution to social security; it is assumed to decline gradually from 20.3%
to 10% in 2019.
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Case C:

In addition to the change in the Japanese savings rate in Case B,

the U.S. savings rate is assumed to increase from 4.4% to 8% in 1995 due to the
sizable cut of the budget deficit and recovery of the personal saving rate to a
historica l standard.
Case A is a simple extrapola tion of the status guo to the future and is
designed to demonstra te how external debt would rise in the absence of policy
actions in the long-i:'un.
Case B examines the impact of changes in the Japanese savings ratio on the
U.S. external debt.

The Japanese savings ratio is often regarded by foreign

observers as excessive ly high (see, however, Hayashi (1986) for the factors that
may exaggerat e the Japanese savings ratio.).

This scenario seems, however,

realistic because Japanese household savings may be reduced if the tax burden
should rise from 36% in 1986 to more than 45% in the early 21st century.

The

Annual Economic Report on the Japanese Economy in 1985 (EPA 1985) examined the
possibili ty based on the life cycle hypothesi s and concluded that the household
savings ratio is likely to decline by 7-13 percentag e points until the mid
2010s.

So Case Bis consisten t with the forecast made in the Annual Report.

Case C is the most desirable scenario, but it is uncertain whether it will
be actually realized.

Determine d political commitmen t is required to attain the

increase of the net national savings ratio even if we take the non neo-Ricar dian
view.

The improveme nt in the savings ratio will be even more difficult if we

take the neo-Ricar dian view.
Under these scenarios , we simulate the borrowing by the United States from
Japan and Germany based on equation (29).

We assume that the rate of technical

progress and the rate of increase in employmen t will remain at the same rates as
those observed in the 1980s.

From recent data, the rates of labor-aug menting

technical progress in the three countries seems to have converged within a
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narrow range from 1.1% to 2.2% in the 1980s.

On the other hand, employment

growth was quite strong in the United States (1.3% increase on a yearly
average), while that in West Germany was very weak (0.7% decrease).

The rate of

increase in employment in Japan lies in between the two countries and is 0.8%.
We assume that the trend of strong employment growth in the United States will
continue over the long-r-un.

In addition to a low national savings ratio, strong

employment growth attracts foreign capital to the United States.

(If the United

States labor force increased at a slower rate, the amount of indebtedness will
be smaller).
We take into consideration the international interest payments transfer by
the United States to Japan and Germany in the simulation, but we ignore interest
payments by the United States, Japan and Germany to the rest of the world and
the interest payment between Japan and Germany.
As will be shown later, interest payments constitute not a negligible part
of external borrowing by the United States, since the external debt accumulates
rapidly, given the sizable difference of saving ratios among the three countries
in the future.
We obtain the capital stock in the next period after deriving the national
saving and net external borrowing (lending).

Given the rates of technical

progress and employment growth, we can calculate the net domestic product in the
next period.

Thus the capital stock, the net borrowing (lending) and the net

domestic product are endogenously determined together with the external debt and
interest payments abroad.
Simulation results are presented in Figure SA, SB and SC.
expressed in 1985 constant U.S. dollars.

All figures are

In Case A the U.S. debt from Japan and

Germany grows rapidly from $80 billion in 1985 to $1620 billion in 2000 and
$4337 billion in 2015, while current-accoun t deficits vis-a-vis Japan and
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Germany in terms of nominal GNP will remain at about the same level as that in
1986.

The interest payments by the United States to Japan and Germany will

amount to $65 billion in 2000 under the assumption of constant world interest
The current account deficit of the United States with Japan and

rates at 4%.

Germany will be $141 billion in 2000 and $235 billion in 2015.

This implies

that the interest payment constitutes 46% of the current-account deficit.
share in the current-account will rise to 74% in 2015.

This

Net private capital

stock will increase about 3.1% annually in the United States during the period
from 1985 to 2000.

The ratio of debt to net private capital stock will rise

from 2% in 1985 to 23.5% in 2000 and 38.7% in 2015, and this upward trend will
still continue after 2030.

The ratio of debt from Japan to net capital stock

will stop increasing at the end of the 2120s, and will settle at around 34%, so
will the sizable share of capital in the United States being owned by the
Japanese.
In Case B the rate of increase of capital stock in Japan will become lower
than that in Case A because of the gradual decline of the Japanese savings ratio
until 2019.
2000.

It will slow down from 5.9% to 5.7% during the period from 1985 to

But the growth rate of capital stock in the United States is not affected

significantly.

The U.S. current-account deficit with Japan and Germany will be

$109 billion in 2000 and $138 billion in 2015.

As compared with Case A, the

U.S. current-account deficit is about 60% in 2015.
however, will be virtually unaffected.

The deficit with Germany,

Net external debt from Japan and Germany

will amount to $1434 billion in 2000 and $3277 billion in 2015.

This amount is

about three quarters of the net debt for 2015 calculated in Case A.
Accordingly, the ratio of external debt to capital stock tends to show a
convergence to the value of 30% in the 2020s.

The ratio of debt from Japan to

capital stock will peak out at the level of 22% in the mid-2010s.
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In Case C the U.S. capital stock will increase more rapidly than those in
It will increase by 4.4% annually.

cases A and B.

External debt will be $1238

billion in 2000 and $2809 billion in 2015, reflecting the significant reduction
of current-acc ount deficits with Japan and Germany.

Accordingly , the ratio of

external debt to capital stock will reach the peak of about 16% in 2010, and
then decline.

The ratio of debt from Japan to capital stock will peak out at

around 13% in 2008.
The result indicates that the recovery of the national savings ratio in the
United States over the medium-term is crucial in achieving lower external debt
ratio and sound economic growth.

The decline of the savings ratio in Japan over

the long-term will help reduce the borrowing from Japan.

But other countries

with high savings like newly industrializ ed countries (NICs) may well replace
Japan in the role of capital exporters to the United States.

In order for the

United States to avoid the excessive dependence on foreign capital, the
effective way is to raise the national savings ratio, possibly through the
reduction in the budget deficit and the recovery of the household savings rate
to its historical standards (cf Figure 2A).

5.

Concludin& Remarks
In this paper we started with the discussion of the two alternative

approaches to internation al capital movements: the "traditiona l" view that
capital moves to equate its rate of return across countries, and the "habitat"
view that the supply of savings creates its own demand in the very country where
it is generated.

The time series data for the United States, Japan and Germany

indicate that past movements of national savings and investment may generally
support the habitat view.

At the same time, however, rapid increases in the

United States' foreign debt imply that the traditional view of capital movement,
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in particular the theory of determinants of capital movements based on growth
accounting, may be significantly meaningful in the future.

In that case, the

low savings ratio in the U.S. economy may drive itself into a heavily indebted
economy.

.

In addition to the two important factors mentioned in the introduction,
there are many factors neglected or simplified in the rather naive setting of
our model.

Just to name a few:· changes in industrial structure, unemployment

and under capacity utilization of capital, (adjustment costs) involved in the
installment of investment (particularly in a foreign country), distinction of
portfolio and indirect investment, the effect of exchange rate changes on
evaluation of capital, the effect of asymmetric corporate income tax across
countries, and so forth.

Also, even with the same level of aggregation as used

in this paper, one could make the discussion more interesting as well as
realistic by making demographic structures, saving behavior and technological
progress to be endogenous.

The entire landscape would also be changed if

developing countries resume their borrowing for development, along with recovery
of their credit credibility that was seriously damaged by the debt crisis in the
_past ten years.
Despite the shortcomings of our model and the simplicity of the calculation
method, the theoretical values obtained succeeds in tracing fairly well the
actual development of external borrowing by the United States from Japan and
notably Germany in the 1980s (see Hamada and Iwata (1985)).

The simulation

exercise based on the "traditional" view demonstrates that the ratio of external
debt to capital stock in the United States will rise to 30-40% over the long run
in the absence of efforts to recover its savings ratio to historical standards
of the 1970s.

The reduction in the high savings ratio in Japan or in Germany

may help reduce the dependence of the United States on foreign capital, but it
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will have a much weaker effect than the increase in the savings ratio in the
United States.

If the United States wishes to avoid the high external

debt-cap ital ratio observed in developin g countries at present, it should aim to
increase its national savings ratio.
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